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CASENOTES
DUSENBERY V. UNITED STATES: SETTING THE
STANDARD FOR ADEQUATE NOTICE
I. INTRODUCTION
Civilized countries have long recognized asset forfeiture as a
means for law enforcement to remove the profit motive from
crimes of greed.1 In response to escalating crime in America, Con-
gress has increased law enforcement's authority to seize and for-
feit the instrumentalities and proceeds of crimes.2 However, the
Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution3 safeguards the rights of the innocent and acts as a
check on the power of law enforcement officials.4 In an effort to
steady the tumultuous balance between law enforcement and pri-
vate property rights, courts have tried to establish guidelines for
the Due Process Clause.5
Courts have generally established that "notice" and "opportu-
nity to be heard" are fundamental to the notion of due process.6
No forfeiture process can withstand a due process attack unless
both notice and opportunity to be heard are afforded.7 While
courts have consistently held parties responsible for providing no-
1. Marc S. Roy, United States Federal Forfeiture Law: Current Status and Implica-
tions of Expansion, 69 MISS. L.J. 373, 374-76 (1999).
2. Douglas Kim, Comment, Asset Forfeiture: Giving Up Your Constitutional Rights,
19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 527, 527 (1997).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002); Kim, supra note 2, at
564.
5. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167-68.
6. See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
7. Id.
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tice and an opportunity to be heard, courts have used inconsistent
standards to determine the adequacy of notice.8
In particular, courts have struggled to determine the adequacy
of notice to those incarcerated by the government.9 Recently, in
Dusenbery v. United States,0 the United States Supreme Court
clarified the due process requirements of notice to persons in the
custody of the federal government." This note discusses the con-
troversies and implications of the Court's holding. Part II ex-
plains the history and evolution of notice requirements through
case law. Part III discusses the facts, history, and holding of the
Dusenbery case. Part IV outlines important topics in the majority
and dissenting opinions in Dusenbery. Finally, Part V reveals the
implications of the Dusenbery holding and the orientation of the
law following the decision.
II. NOTICE IN ASSET FORFEITURE CLAIMS
A. History of Asset Forfeiture
Asset forfeiture has been recognized in American jurisprudence
since the foundation of the Union.'2 Its origins can be traced as
far back as early Rome and Greece, but are more specifically de-
rived from English common law." In cases of treason or felony,
the English government could attach a defending party's property
to the criminal charges, and, if found guilty, the Crown could de-
clare the property forfeited.' 4 The United States has adopted
similar provisions in both criminal and civil laws.'" Any property
8. See, e.g., United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147 (3d Cir.
2000); Yeung Mung Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Clark, 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996). For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
11. Id. at 166-67.
12. Kim, supra note 2, at 528.
13. Roy, supra note 1, at 374.
14. Id. at 375.
15. Kim, supra note 2, at 527. Asset forfeiture laws in the United States began "in
connection with felonies or treason." Id. at 532. An offender could be denied property own-
ership because of violations of criminal laws. Id. Civil statutes regulating customs and
revenue also included forfeiture statutes. Id. Following the adoption of the Constitution,
forfeiture laws were enacted under federal law. Id. at 532-33. Currently, over 350 statu-
tory forfeitures are allowed under federal law. Roy, supra note 1, at 377.
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connected to a criminal act or civil violation may be subject to as-
set forfeiture laws and may be sold or destroyed by the federal
government. 16 Hoping to diminish profits from crime, deter future
illegal activity, and help finance the war against crime, Congress
has periodically expanded law enforcement's asset forfeiture pow-
ers.17 As a result of the increased leeway given to law enforce-
ment authorities, asset forfeiture provisions now dance a fine
constitutional line, often bordering on violations of the Due Proc-
ess Clause in the Fifth Amendment."8
Before the government can declare property forfeited, due
process requires the acting government agency to send notice to
any parties with a potential claim to the property. 9 The inter-
ested parties must be given an opportunity to present their objec-
tions before an impartial tribunal.2 ° Until 1950, courts generally
held that publication of notice was enough to satisfy due proc-
ess.2' However, in 1950, the United States Supreme Court held in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.22 that publication
alone is not sufficient when the parties' identities and where-
abouts are known or can be reasonably ascertained.23 The Court
also held that notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action."24 Six years later, in Walker v. City of Hutchinson25
16. See Kim, supra note 2, at 534-35. Criminal forfeiture laws are accompanied by a
greater burden of proof than civil forfeiture laws. Id. The Fourth Circuit, for example, re-
quires that all "elements of the criminal offense ... be proven beyond a reasonable doubt"
and a preponderance of evidence must show that the property furthered the crime or was
a proceed of the crime. Id. at 538. In civil forfeiture actions, the burden is relaxed, and the
government must simply show reasonable grounds (but more than mere suspicion) that
the property is connected to an unlawful act. Id. at 539-40.
17. Id. at 527.
18. See id.
19. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
20. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause enti-
tles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.").
21. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 3.19 (3d ed. 1999).
22. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In 1946, Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. established a
common trust fund with 113 participants. Id. at 309. Many of the beneficiaries were not
residents of New York. Id. Notice of the first accounting was given to the beneficiaries by
publication in a local New York newspaper. Id. An attorney, who had been appointed spe-
cial guardian of the trust fund, filed a complaint claiming that notice of the accounting
was inadequate. Id. at 310-11.
23. Id. at 318-19.
24. Id. at 314.
25. 352 U.S. 112 (1956). The City of Hutchinson, Kansas, filed an action to condemn
2003]
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the Supreme Court expanded the Mullane decision by holding
that publication was insufficient because the property owner's
name was known to the city through city records.26
In the 1972 case of Robinson v. Hanrahan,2 7 the Supreme
Court held that notice mailed only to a property owner's residence
was insufficient because the state knew that the owner was in
prison.2" The Court relied upon the Mullane standard to conclude
that notice was not "reasonably calculated" to reach the owner.29
However, four years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge," the Court
used a balancing test instead of using the Mullane standard to
determine the adequacy of notice.3' While at first glance this
seems like a drastic departure from the Court's consistent use of
part of the petitioner's property in order to widen a city street. Id. at 112-13. The District
Court of Reno County, Kansas, appointed three commissioners to determine the compen-
sation for the taking of property as well as any other damages. Id. at 113. As required by
law, the commissioners published notice of their proceedings in Hutchinson's official city
paper. Id. at 114. The commissioners fixed the damages at $725 and deposited the money
in the city treasury. Id. The petitioner did not appeal within the statutory thirty days. Id.
Some time after the thirty days, the petitioner filed a complaint in the district court alleg-
ing that he never received notice of the condemnation proceedings and that notice by pub-
lication did not satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements. Id.
26. Id. at 116.
27. 409 U.S. 38 (1972). Robinson was arrested and charged with armed robbery. Id. at
38. The State of Illinois commenced forfeiture proceedings on Robinson's automobile. Id.
The State mailed notice of the forfeiture proceedings to Robinson's home, but not to the
jail facility. Id. Robinson did not receive notice of the proceedings until after his release, at
which time the forfeiture proceedings had already been concluded. Id. at 39. Robinson filed
a motion requesting that the forfeiture be set aside because notice was inadequate to sat-
isfy the due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
28. Id. at 40.
29. Id.
30. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge was awarded Social Security disability benefits in
1968 because of chronic anxiety and back strain. Id. at 323, 324 n.2. In 1972, Eldridge re-
ceived and completed a questionnaire from the state agency responsible for his case. Id. at
323-24. Two months later, the state agency determined that Eldridge was no longer dis-
abled and discontinued the disability payments. Id. at 324. Notification was sent to El-
dridge advising him of his right to seek review and reconsideration by the state agency
within six months. Id. Eldridge commenced an action challenging the validity of the ad-
ministrative procedures used to review his disability. Id. at 324-25. The Supreme Court
balanced the following three factors to determine the adequacy of due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
31. See id. at 335.
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the Mullane standard, it is easy to see why a balancing test was
needed in this particular case. In Mathews, the Court was not
only examining the adequacy of notice, but was also determining
whether Eldridge was denied due process when the Social Secu-
rity Administration terminated his benefits without a hearing.32
In making this determination, the Court balanced the govern-
ment's interests and administrative burdens against Eldridge's
private interests.33
Ten years later, in Greene v. Lindsey,34 the Court returned to
the Mullane standard, holding that posting an eviction notice on
the door of a residence was insufficient because the deputies
knew that children often removed the notices before the tenants
could read them.3" Relying on the Mullane standard,36 the Court
concluded that notice was insufficient because it was not rea-
sonably calculated to reach those for whom it was intended, espe-
cially when notice by other means, such as certified mail, would
have guaranteed notice.3 ' Furthermore, in Tulsa Professional Col-
lection Services, Inc. v. Pope,"8 the Court demonstrated the reach
of the Mullane decision, holding that notice by mail must be sent
to any creditor of an estate who is reasonably ascertainable.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 334-35.
34. 456 U.S. 444 (1982). The appellees were tenants of a Louisville, Kentucky, housing
project. Id. at 446. The Housing Authority of Louisville filed for repossession of the defen-
dant's apartments. Id. The deputy sheriffs charged with serving process posted notice on
the door of the apartment in accordance with state law. Id. The residents filed a class ac-
tion complaint alleging that they never received notice and that posting did not satisfy the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 446-47.
35. Id. at 453.
36. Id. at 449-50.
37. Id. at 453-55.
38. 485 U.S. 478 (1988). H. Everett Pope, Jr., died testate in 1979, survived by his
wife JoAnne Pope. Id. at 482. JoAnne Pope was named executrix of her husband's estate
and, as statutorily required, published notice to creditors in the Tulsa Daily Legal News
for two consecutive weeks. Id. Appellant Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc.
("Tulsa") was a subsidiary of St: John Medical Center, where the decedent was treated
prior to his death. Id. After the expiration of the two month claims period, Tulsa filed an
order to compel payment of the medical expenses. Id. During a rehearing, Tulsa claimed
that notice by publication did not satisfy due process requirements because the identity of
the creditor was readily accessible. Id. at 483.
39. Id. at 491.
20031
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B. Confusion in the Lower Courts
While the Mullane standard set a clear precedent for the lower
courts to follow in most circumstances, confusion remained con-
cerning how the standard should be applied to inmates under the
control of a state or federal institution." Much of this confusion
centered around the issue of whether due process required actual
notice.
In Yeung Mung Weng v. United States,4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that if the property
owner is incarcerated, the government must take steps to deter-
mine the inmate's location and ensure actual receipt of notice.42
Specifically, the Second Circuit held that mailing notice to the in-
stitution where an inmate is detained does not "constitute[ ] ade-
quate notification of the forfeiture if the notice is not in fact deliv-
ered to the prisoner-owner."4" To justify this requirement of
actual notice, the court used a balancing test, weighing "the na-
ture of the interests involved, the likelihood that others similarly
situated will protect a property owner's interests, and the reason-
ableness of imposing more onerous requirements on the entity ob-
ligated to give notice."44 The court found that it was not an undue
hardship for a federal agency to deliver the notice in a manner
that ensures receipt and concluded that merely mailing the notice
did not satisfy the Mullane standard. "
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Clark46
that simply sending notice by certified mail to the inmate at the
40. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 166 (2002).
41. 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1998). Weng was arrested by the FBI on narcotics charges in
1990. Id. at 710. During the arrest, FBI agents seized $19,150 in jewelry and $65,900 in
cash. Id. at 711. While Weng was in federal custody, the FBI initiated forfeiture proceed-
ings, sending notice by certified mail to Weng's residence and the detention facility in New
York City where it was documented that he was incarcerated. Id. Weng filed a complaint
stating that he was transferred to different facilities several times and never received no-
tice. Id. at 712.
42. Id. at 714-15.
43. Id. at 714.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 715.
46. 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996). In 1994, Clark was arrested for attempting to buy six
kilograms of cocaine from an undercover FBI agent. Id. at 379-80. After the arrest, the
FBI seized $101,760 from Clark. Id. at 380. Notice of the forfeiture proceedings was sent
by certified mail to the jail where Clark was incarcerated, to his last known residence, and
by publication in the New York Times. Id. The return receipt to the residence was signed
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place of incarceration was sufficient to satisfy due process, even if
the inmate never actually received the notification.47 The court
stated that "due process does not require that the interested
party actually receive the notice."" Rejecting Clark's claim that
notice must be received by the inmate in order to satisfy due
process, the court said that Clark would have to show extraordi-
nary circumstances that merited actual notice.49 The Tenth Cir-
cuit refused to create an actual notice requirement "[a]bsent ex-
traordinary circumstances."5
Taking the middle ground, the Third Circuit held in United
States v. One Toshiba Color Television5 that certified mail was
acceptable as long as the government could show that procedures
were in place at the institution to ensure proper delivery.52 In To-
shiba, the court examined the decisions in both Clark and Weng
and used a combination. of both holdings.53 The court held that
"the government need not prove actual notice," but if the govern-
ment relied on anything less than actual notice, they bore the
burden of showing that procedures were in place to ensure actual
notice.54
In Toshiba, the Third Circuit noted, "[olur sister circuits have
differed on what kind of notice is the constitutional minimum for
incarcerated individuals whose property is subject to forfeiture."5
In Weng, the Second Circuit used'a balancing test and required
actual notice,56 whereas in Clark, the Tenth Circuit used Mullane
by someone thought to be Clark's mother-in-law. Id. After the money was forfeited, Clark
filed a complaint alleging that notice was inadequate because even though it was sent to
the correct facility, he never received it. Id.
47. Id. at 381.
48. Id. at 380.
49. Id. at 381.
50. Id.
51. 213 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2000). Reginald McGlory was arrested in 1989 on drug
charges. Id. at 150. During the arrest, officers seized several items including a Toshiba
television, two answering machines, a computer, and jewelry. Id. at 150-51. Notice of for-
feiture proceedings was mailed to the county jail where McGlory was being held. Id. at
151. Notice was received and signed for by the jail personnel. Id. Notice was also sent to
McGlory's previous address, to his ex-wife, and to an attorney; as well as published in a
general circulation newspaper. Id. McGlory filed an action claiming that because he never
received notice, the due process requirements had not been met. Id.
52. Id. at 155.
53. Id. at 153-55.
54. Id. at 155.
55. Id. at 153.
56. Yeung Mung Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1998).
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and specifically held that actual notice was not necessary." The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dusenbery v.
United States" in order to determine the appropriate test and es-
tablish one clear standard for all federal courts to apply.59
III. HISTORY OF THE DUSENBERY CASE
In April 1986, the FBI arrested Larry Dean Dusenbery at a
house trailer in Atwater, Ohio.6" Executing a search warrant, FBI
officers seized drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, a knife, an
automobile, and $21,939 in cash.6 In June 1986, Dusenbery
pleaded guilty to possession of 813 grams of cocaine with the in-
tent to distribute.62 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio sentenced Dusenbery to twelve years of
imprisonment and six years of parole.63 Unable to determine the
rightful owner, the FBI destroyed the firearms and the knife in
1988 by order of the district court.64
The FBI sent notice of pending forfeiture actions for the cash
and the automobile to the Federal Correctional Institution where
Dusenbery was located, to the address where Dusenbery was ar-
rested, and to an address in Randolph, Ohio where Dusenbery's
mother lived.65 The FBI also published notice consecutively in
three Sunday editions of the Cleveland Plain Dealer.66 Having re-
ceived no response to the notices after twenty days, the FBI de-
clared the cash and the car forfeited and turned the cash over to
the United States Marshals Service.67
Five years later, Dusenbery filed a motion to reclaim the prop-
erty.68 The United States District Court for the Northern District
57. United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996).
58. 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
59. Id. at 166-67.
60. Id. at 163.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 164.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 164-65.
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of Ohio denied the motion, ruling that "any challenge to the for-
feiture proceedings should have been brought in a civil action, not
as a motion ancillary to petitioner's now-closed criminal case."69
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the proceed-
ings back to the district court, holding that the district court
should have construed the motion as a "civil complaint seeking
equitable relief for a due process challenge to adequacy of the no-
tice."7 ° On remand, the district court held that notice by certified
mail to the place of incarceration satisfied due process require-
ments.7 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adding that absence of proof
that Dusenbery actually received notice was irrelevant.7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and af-
firmed the Sixth Circuit's decision.73 Writing for a narrow 5-4
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist74 held that notice by mail to
Dusenbery's place of incarceration was "'reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise [petitioner] of the pend-
ency of the action" and, therefore, satisfied due process require-
ments.75
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
1. The Mullane Standard
Despite arguments from Dusenbery, Chief Justice Rehnquist
relied heavily on the Mullane standard to reach the majority's
holding.76 Dusenbery argued that the Court should apply the bal-
ancing test used in Mathews v. Eldridge.77 The majority, however,
69. Id. at 165.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 166:
72. Id.
73. Id. at 166-67.
74. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Id. at 162.
75. Id. at 172-173 (alteration in original) (quoting Mullane v Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
76. Id. at 167-68.
77. Id. at 167. For a discussion of the Mathews balancing test see supra notes 30-33
and accompanying text.
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determined that Mullane was the correct standard, noting that
Mathews has never been used as an "all-embracing test for decid-
ing due process claims.""8 The majority argued that the Court has
consistently turned to the Mullane standard when faced with
similar notice issues.79
In applying the Mullane test, the Court asked whether notice
was "reasonably calculated under all the circumstances" to ap-
prise Dusenbery of the pending forfeiture.8 0 The majority held
that the actions taken by the FBI to send notice to Dusenbery
were sufficient to satisfy the Mullane standard."1 Specifically, the
majority determined that sending notice by certified mail to the
institution where Dusenbery was incarcerated was enough to
meet the "reasonably calculated" threshold. 2
2. Actual Notice
The issue of whether due process requires actual notice when
the property owner is incarcerated has been particularly trou-
bling for the lower courts.83 The Supreme Court attempted to
clarify this ambiguity in the Dusenbery decision. 4 The majority
opinion noted that the Court has never required actual notice in
forfeiture proceedings.8" The majority argued that while due proc-
ess does require a calculated and good faith effort, it does not re-
78. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 168.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 172-73.
82. Id.
83. Examples of cases that have not required actual notice include United States v.
Clark, 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that mailing notice to prison is sufficient),
United States v. Derenak, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that mailing no-
tice to prison, home address, and newspaper publication satisfies due process even if de-
fendant did not receive notice), and Scott v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1996)
(finding that regardless of whether notice is actually received, mailing notice to prison and
publication is adequate). Other courts have held that actual notice is required. See United
States v. $5,000 in United States Currency, 184 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
government must show that the prisoner received actual notice); Yeung Mung Weng v.
United States, 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that mailing notice to prison is inade-
quate if notice is not delivered to prisoner); United States v. Cupples, 112 F.3d 318 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the government is required to give actual notice to the prisoner or
his counsel).
84. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 166-67.
85. Id. at 170.
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quire "heroic efforts by the government." 6 The majority cited per-
sonal service as an example of an unnecessary heroic effort." In-
stead, the Court placed a burden on the government to show that
their chosen method was "'reasonably calculated' to apprise a
party of the pendency of the action."88
B. Dissenting Opinion
1. The Mullane Standard
In the dissenting opinion, 9 Justice Ginsburg argued that the
method of notice used by the FBI to notify Dusenbery failed to
meet the Mullane standard because there was a feasible alterna-
tive that was more likely "'to bring home notice' than the method
used.90 The dissent viewed the delivery process differently from
the majority in two ways. First, while the majority made a dis-
tinction between the FBI and the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"),91 the
dissent said that there was no distinction because both are "part
of the same Government."92 Second, the dissent separated the two
mail systems being used to deliver notice-the United States
Postal Service ("USPS") and the prison's internal mail system.93
Looking at the mail system from this vantage point, the dissent
argued that the government must reasonably calculate that the
mail would not only reach its intended recipient through the
USPS system, but also through the prison's mail system.94 The
dissent argued that while notice sent through the postal service
satisfied the Mullane standard because of USPS's proven effi-
ciency and reliability, the government never satisfied its burden
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)).
89. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer joined. Id. at 173 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
90. Id. at 178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
91. Id. at 168-69.
92. Id. at 178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 179-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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of showing that the mail in the prison was "reasonably calcu-
lated" to reach its recipient.95
Justice Ginsburg argued that the FBI employed a system that
was "'substantially less likely to bring home notice [to prison in-
mates]' than a 'feasible... substitut[e]. " Justice Ginsburg pro-
posed that "substantial improvements in reliability could have
been had... at minimal expense and inconvenience" to the gov-
ernment." Justice Ginsburg found that recent modifications to
the notification system illustrated the feasibility of such im-
provements.9" Under the cited system, inmates sign a logbook
upon receipt of mail.99 Should an inmate refuse to sign, a prison
officer documents that refusal."' Additionally, any mail marked
"'congressional, judicial, law enforcement, and attorney corre-
spondence,"' which would include asset forfeiture notification, is
opened in the inmate's presence to ensure that the inmate reads
the mail.10 1
2. Actual Notice
While the majority held the FBI responsible only for its method
of sending notice,0 2 the dissent held the FBI responsible until no-
tice reached its intended destination, requiring actual receipt.' 3
The dissent argued that public policy requires actual notice be-
cause in many cases no other protections would safeguard an
owner's interest.10 4 The dissent distinguished Mullane by pointing
out that even if notice only reached a few trustees, those few
would naturally protect all other trustees' interests.0 5 Justice
95. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the government "intro-
duced nothing to show the reasonableness or reliability" of the prison mail system. Id. at
180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Mullane, 339
U.S. at 315).
97. Id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the United States at 29 n.19,
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002) (No. 00-6567)).
102. Id. at 168-69.
103. Id. at 179-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Ginsburg argued that the situation is much different for prison-
ers because no others share an interest in the property, and "[n]o
others are similarly situated"; therefore, there is no one else to
safeguard prisoners' interests absent actual notice. °6
V. IMPACTS OF THE DUSENBERY HOLDING
A. An Affirmation of the Mullane Standard
1. Determining the Appropriate Standard
The majority's use of the Mullane test is supported by a signifi-
cant amount of case law."0 7 The Court has consistently employed
Mullane's "reasonably calculated" test when determining the suf-
ficiency of notice."0 In addition to numerous Supreme Court deci-
sions utilizing the Mullane test,"0 9 the majority of lower courts
apply Mullane's "reasonably calculated" test when deciding notice
issues involving prison inmates."0
While the Court has used the Mathews balancing test to de-
termine if failure to give any form of notice can withstand a due
process attack,"' it is not applicable in determining the adequacy
of the method used to give notice."' The Mathews factors assess
the risks of "erroneous deprivation" of individual property rights
and balance those risks against the overall interest of the gov-
106. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 168.
108. Id.; see, e.g., Tulsa Prof] Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484-85
(1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 797 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey,
456 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1982); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39-40 (1972); Walker v.
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1956).
109. See cases cited supra note 108.
110. See, e.g., Whiting v. United States, 231 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 2000); Krecoich v. United
States, 221 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2000); Allen v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Md.
1999), affd, 238 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2000); Concepcion v. United States, 983 F. Supp. 134
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
111. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976); see, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520
U.S. 924, 932-33 (1997) (holding that the due process rights of an employee were not vio-
lated when the employee was demoted without notice or an opportunity to be heard pend-
ing criminal drug charges); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
53 (1993) (holding that pre-deprivation notice was not required before seizing real prop-
erty related to a drug conviction if justified by the Mathews test).
112. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167-68.
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ernment and the costs of additional safeguards."3 However, the
important determination made by the Court in Dusenbery was
the character of the FBI's method, "not the possibility of 'conceiv-
able injury.""' 4 Because the Court was analyzing the method of
notice, not the failure of the notice, an assessment of the risks of
failed receipt of notice was not necessary."5 Had the FBI ne-
glected to attempt to send any notice to the facility where Dusen-
bery was incarcerated, then the Mathews test might have been
appropriate.1 6
In Dusenbery, the Court affirmed-in no unclear terms-that
the Mullane standard is the appropriate analytical framework for
determining whether a method of delivery of notice satisfies the
due process requirements in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 7 By choosing the Mullane analysis, the Court focused on
the method of delivery of notice instead of on the result of the de-
livery."' In turn, this specific focus on method enabled the major-
ity to reach its conclusion that the government's notice to Dusen-
bery satisfied due process."'9
2. Applying the Mullane Standard
According to the Court in Mullane, the intent of the notifying
agency is a critical aspect of the "reasonably calculated" test. 20
The Court made it clear in Mullane that "a mere gesture" or sim-
ply going through the procedural motions is not enough.' 2' The
Court explained that "[t]he means employed must be such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it."1 22 The agency must intend for the prop-
113. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
114. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170-71 (quoting Mullane v, Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)).
115. Id. at 168-69.
116. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 (assessing the effects on due process rights if
notice is not sent at all).
117. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167.
118. See id. at 170 ("[W]e have allowed the Government to defend the 'reasonableness
and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method.. .. '" (quoting Mullane, 339
U.S. at 315)).
119. Id. at 172-73.
120. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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erty owner to receive notice and must use a means designed to
accomplish that end.
1 23
The facts in Dusenbery are easily distinguished from those in
Greene v. Lindsey,'24 where the deputies knew there was a good
chance that notice would never be received by the intended re-
cipients. 125 In Dusenbery, the Court found that the FBI sent certi-
fied mail to the facility where Dusenbery was being held and that
the prison staff signed for the mail and entered it into a log-
book.126 This was all the evidence that the Court needed to con-
clude that the Mullane threshold of actually attempting to inform
the property owner had been met.'27
Once the government offered evidence showing reasonably cal-
culated notice, the burden shifted to Dusenbery to show why the
FBI's efforts did not meet the Mullane threshold.'28 Instead of
contesting the FBI's use of certified mail, Dusenbery argued that
notice was insufficient because the methods employed by the
prison staff, not the FBI, were insufficient.'29 In the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist never discussed the FBI's
knowledge of the prison mail system.' 30 But one can infer from
the facts that the FBI had no reason to expect an unsuccessful de-
livery and probably believed in good faith that the certified mail
would reach Dusenbery."3' Dusenbery never challenged this in-
ference. 13 2
123. Id.
124. 456 U.S. 444 (1982); see supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
125. Greene, 456 U.S. at 448. In Sarit v. United States Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, 987 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1993), the First Circuit stated that "an implicit bad faith stan-
dard" would invalidate notice even when all procedures had been correctly followed if the
agency knew or had reason to know that notice would be ineffective. Id. at 14. In Owens v.
United States, No. 96-CV-5928, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21706 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1997), the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that notice by
certified mail is reasonable if the government lacked 'reason to believe that its notice
never reached the addressee." Id. at *9.
126. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 165-66 (2002).
127. Id. at 172-73.
128. See id. at 168-69.
129. Id. at 169.
130. See id at 163-73.
131. See id. at 168-69
132. Id. at 169.
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B. Actual Notice: No Exceptions for Inmates
1. Majority Opinion: Burdens Outweigh the Due Process Risks
The Supreme Court's holding clarified any ambiguity among
the lower courts-and within its own previous decisions-
regarding the requirements of notice.133 The Court concluded that
actual notice is not necessary as long as the method of notice de-
livery meets the Mullane standard."' Case law supports this po-
sition, as the Court has never ruled that actual notice is a pre-
requisite for forfeiture. 35 In Mullane the Court stated that
"reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every bene-
ficiary are justifiable."136 According to Mullane, a certain degree
of risk that the mail will not reach its destination is acceptable,
provided there is no reasonable alternative means that will en-
sure delivery with greater certainty.137 In both Mullane and
Dusenbery, the Court focused on how notice was sent, rather than
whether notice was actually received.138
Similarly, in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,139 the
Court noted that the State is required to "make efforts to provide
actual notice," but the Court stopped short of requiring actual no-
tice. 4 ' The Court again focused on the attempted means of deliv-
ery and not the result.' In Tulsa Professional Collection Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Pope,'42 the Court affirmed its Mennonite decision,
holding that when the identity of a creditor is reasonably ascer-
tainable, notice by mail or another equally reliable means is re-
quired.143
133. For a detailed discussion of the lower courts' confusion, see supra Part II.B.
134. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172-73.
135. Id. at 170.
136. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 315; Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172.
139. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
140. Id. at 796 n.3.
141. Id. at 800.
142. 485 U.S. 478 (1988); see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
143. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 491. The Tulsa Court, relying on language from Mennonite,
stated that "the Due Process Clause requires that appellant be given 'In] otice by mail or
other means as certain to ensure actual notice."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Men-
nonite, 462 U.S. at 800). This should not be misconstrued to mean that actual notice is re-
quired. The phrase "as certain to ensure" is ambiguously placed and probably qualifies the
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It is widely held that personal service is unnecessary in most
situations because it is unquestionably slow and expensive."'
Therefore, most courts no longer require personal service when a
feasible alternative exists.145 The only alternative means of assur-
ing actual notice in this context would inevitably entail changing
the mail system within prisons to require that a prison employee
watch the prisoner open the notice and the inmate sign a receipt
to be mailed back to the agency.146 The majority dismissed this al-
ternative because, although it would create more evidence of re-
ceipt, it would not make the mode of delivery any more reliable.'47
If due process does not require actual notice, as the majority con-
tended, 4 ' then the means of delivery, not the end receipt, should
be the focus of the analysis.149 All that due process requires is
that the means of delivery be reasonably calculated to reach the
intended property owner. 150 Changing the system to require a re-
cord of end receipt would increase the government's effort and
expense but would not improve the method of delivery. 5'
2. Dissenting Opinion: Prisoners' Right to Due Process
Protections
Dusenbery did not contest the motives of the FBI or the ade-
quacy of certified mail. 52 Instead, Dusenbery argued that in-
mates are an excepted group and require actual notice because
they have little control over their environment, while the gov-
word "means," explaining that the method of delivery used must be at least as reliable as
delivery by mail. See id. Furthermore, in Dusenbery, the Court clarified that the meaning
of "actual" in the Tulsa decision was ambiguous and probably signified notice by mail and
not actual receipt. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 169 n.5.
144. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-19.
145. Id. The Mullane Court determined that when notice must be served on a "large
number of known resident or nonresident beneficiaries," personal service would impede
proper administration of service because of unnecessary delay and expense. Id. Further-
more, in the Dusenbery dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg listed a number of cases
where service by mail was deemed an adequate alternative to personal service. Dusenbery,
534 U.S. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In these cases, the Court identified mail ser-
vice as a satisfactory supplement to statutory provisions for publication or posting.").
146. Id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 172.
148. Id. at 170.
149. Id. at 172.
150. Id. at 170.
151. See id. at 171-72.
152. Id. at 169.
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ernment exercises a great deal of control over their location and
the information inmates receive.'53 Dusenbery cited cases from
various appellate courts in which similar claims of nonreceipt
were asserted.' It should be noted, however, that none of the de-
cisions, including Dusenbery, provided enough evidence to con-
clude that the prisoner never in fact received notice. 155 Without
safeguards against frivolous claims, any inmate could file a law-
suit falsely claiming that notice was never received.'56 Then, the
government would shoulder the difficult burden of proving actual
receipt.
Ordinarily, a prisoner's ownership interest "stands alone" with
no other "similarly situated" interests to protect it. 7 This was in
fact the situation for Dusenbery. 158 Because he allegedly never re-
ceived notice, Dusenbery was inevitably deprived of an opportu-
nity to be heard. 9 The majority could find no remedy for this
significant public policy concern. 6 °
C. The Limitations on Feasible Alternatives
In order for notice to fall short of the due process threshold, the
chosen means of notification must be "substantially less likely to
bring home notice than other ... feasible and customary substi-
tutes."'' As an alternative, Justice Ginsburg proposed the addi-
tion of new procedures requiring an inmate to sign a logbook
upon delivery of notice. 62 In fact, such a system was implemented
nationwide by the Bureau of Prisons during the 1990s.'
63
However, this alternative does not ensure a more reliable
means of delivery. While the dissent made a good argument that
these added procedures would increase the prison's incentive to
153. Id. at 169-70.
154. Id. at 172 n.6.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 173 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
161. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
162. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 180 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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effectively deliver its prisoners' mail, i64 the system of delivery
would not change at all under these procedures.165 Instead, noth-
ing more than a new system of receipt would be put into place.'66
The dissent argued that a system that returned a receipt to the
sender would alert such sender if notice was not received.'67 This
would prompt the sender to resend notice until receipt could be
confirmed.'68 Nevertheless, even this system would not change
the method of delivery. None of these receipt-focused alternatives
would improve the means of delivery, but rather would simply
document the receipt. As previously discussed, both the Mullane
standard and other precedent are only concerned with the method
of delivery, and not the effectiveness of receipt.'69
Even if these alternatives had changed the outcome under the
Mullane test, their past availability could only be discussed in
hindsight.7 ° Despite the dissent's claims that the government
"should not be 'penalized' for upgrading its policies,"' 7' the dis-
senting opinion relied on those very upgrades to show that alter-
natives existed.'72 The dissent's feasible alternative was a mail
system that was put into place some time after Dusenbery's no-
tice failed. 7 The dissent argued that the improvements could
have been made prior to 1988 "at minimal expense and inconven-
ience."174 There was no proof, however, that prison officials were
familiar with such an idea prior to 1988.' The dissent admitted
that the government should not be "penalized" for bettering its
policies,'76 yet the basis for this "feasible" alternative rested on
the government's own innovative policy.'77
164. Id. at 180 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
170. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 169-73 (referencing the transcripts from oral argu-
ment stating that the case "is not really a mailed notice case because the procedures that
are inadequate are the procedures that happened after the mailing").
171. Id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175. See at 169-73.
176. Id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Basing such reasoning on hindsight is dangerous to public pol-
icy in the same way that it would be dangerous to pass a new
criminal law and hold people responsible for it retroactively.178
Without a form of "grandfathering" or prior notice that the rules
have changed, the government would be placed at an unfair dis-
advantage. 7 9 Such practices could have dangerous implications.
Specifically, convicted drug dealers might be able to reclaim pro-
ceeds from their illegal drug trade simply by alleging that they
never received notice.
8 0
D. Impact on Persons Incarcerated by the Federal Government
The Supreme Court's opinions on prisoners' rights have shifted
dramatically over the past century.'8' During the early-to-mid
1900s, the Court embraced a "hands-off doctrine."'82 Initially the
courts viewed prisoners as "slaves of the state," and, therefore,
prisoners had few rights except those the state chose to extend to
them.'83 By the mid-1900s, the courts had acknowledged that
prisoners do retain some rights upon incarceration, but insisted
that the enforcement of those rights was the responsibility of the
legislative and executive branches.'84
With the onset of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam
War protests, the Supreme Court under the charge of Chief Jus-
tice Warren began extending constitutional protections to prison-
ers. 8 5 Landmark cases during this period included Mapp v.
Ohio,'86 Robinson v. California,'87 Cooper v. Pate, 188 Miranda v.
178. See id. at 169-73. But see id. at 178-79, 181 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 169-73 (stating that the government is not required to go to "heroic ef-
forts").
180. See id.
181. Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoner's Rights, FED. PROBATION, Mar.
1995, at 36, 36.
182. LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS'
RIGHTS 140 (5th ed. 1998); see also Call, supra note 181, at 36.
183. BRANHAM, supra note 182, at 140 (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871)); see also Call, supra note 181, at 36.
184. BRANHAM, supra note 182, at 140.
185. Id. at 142-43.
186. 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (extending the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
to the states).
187. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment to the states).
188. 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (allowing a prisoner to bring a § 1983 suit alleging viola-
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Arizona, 189 and Wolff v. McDonnell.190 By 1980, a more conserva-
tive Supreme Court began limiting or refusing to expand prison-
ers' rights, while giving more deference to corrections officials. 9 '
In several cases, the Court held that inmates' rights were not pro-
tected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution because the ac-
tions taken by corrections officials did not affect a "liberty inter-
est."192 Under this conservative Court, inmates lost two important
search cases, 193 several First Amendment cases,194 and three im-
portant Eighth Amendment cases.'95 Not only did inmates lose
these cases, but additionally the Court's holdings made it even
more difficult for prisoners to succeed in future suits.' 96
tion of freedom of religion when prison personnel refused to let a prisoner purchase reli-
gious materials).
189. 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that statements obtained from criminal de-
tainees, without first giving full warning of constitutional rights, were inadmissible be-
cause they violated the Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination).
190. 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is no iron curtain drawn between the Consti-
tution and the prisons of this country.").
191. Call, supra note 181, at 38-40.
192. Id. at 39. See, e.g., Ky. Dept. of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) (conclud-
ing that inmates did not have liberty interest in receiving visitors); Jago v. Van Curen, 454
U.S. 14 (1981) (funding that inmates did not have liberty interest requiring hearing to ex-
plain recision of parole); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (holding
that inmates had no constitutional right to commutation of sentence); Greenholtz v. In-
mates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that inmates did not
have constitutionally protected liberty interest in initial grant of parole).
193. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591 (1984) (holding that "shakedown"
searches are reasonable responses to security concerns and do not violate prisoners' due
process rights, even if the prisoners are not allowed to observe the search); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and, therefore, shakedown searches of their cells are not a violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights).
194. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (holding that restric-
tions on a prisoner's opportunity to observe certain religious ceremonies were reasonable
in light of the security needs and resources of the prison); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91
(1987) (holding that a rule prohibiting prisoners from corresponding with inmates in other
prisons was constitutional because the regulation was clearly and reasonably related to
legitimate security concerns).
195. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991) (holding that in order to prevail
with a claim of cruel and unusual punishment stemming from the overcrowding of pris-
ons, a prisoner must show deliberate indifference by the prison officials); Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (holding that the shooting of a prisoner during a riot,
even if that prisoner was not involved in the uprising, was not a violation of the Eighth
Amendment in light of the prison's need to maintain security); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (holding that keeping two prisoners in one cell is not a violation of the
Eighth Amendment).
196. Call, supra note 181, at 41.
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With the addition of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in the
1990s, the Court became less conservative regarding prisoners'
rights.197 However, Justices Scalia and Thomas tend to heavily
support the corrections officers.' With conservatives still in con-
trol of the Court, one can speculate that the trend seen beginning
in the 1980s will continue until another justice is appointed to the
Court.'99
The Dusenbery holding continues the Court's conservative di-
rection. The Court made a tremendous impact on prisoners' due
process rights by choosing to follow the more relaxed notice and
opportunity to be heard requirements of Mullane rather than
Mathews.2"' The Dusenbery decision exposed the possibility that
persons incarcerated by the federal government may never re-
ceive notice that forfeiture proceedings are pending against their
property.2 °1 Consequently, those incarcerated may never have the
opportunity to show that their property was not connected to the
crime. On its face, this seems contrary to the express language in
the United States Constitution." 2 The Fifth Amendment states,
"[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."20 3 However, the majority of justices
interpreted the Due Process Clause as requiring law enforcement
to take steps "reasonably calculated under all the circumstances"
to notify all potential property owners that their property was
subject to forfeiture.2 4
The majority did not want to hold law enforcement responsible
in the event that notice not arrive due to factors beyond their con-
trol.205 In reality, the chances that a guilty party will not receive
notice when the delivery has been reasonably calculated to reach
them are very small. Dusenbery cited several cases alleging non-
receipt of notice; however, in each of those cases there was no
197. Id. at 45. Prof. Call predicts that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer would support pro-
inmate positions. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167.
201. Id. at 181 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. See id.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
204. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 168.
205. See id. at 170.
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concrete proof of nonreceipt. 2 6 Had the Court taken Justice Gins-
burg's position, law enforcement officers would have an absolute
obligation to ensure that notice was received by an inmate before
any property could undergo forfeiture proceedings. 2 7 These are
the very "heroic efforts" that the Court was trying to avoid.208
Furthermore, requiring actual notice would open a Pandora's
box, allowing any criminal to bring a claim that notice was never
received and that due process had been violated. Because no sys-
tems existed in the past to document receipt, the government
would look to prison employees to testify about the delivery of a
single letter that had occurred years beforehand.20 9 Cases would
turn on this kind of disputed and cloudy testimony.210 There
would be no safeguards against the fraudulent testimony of in-
mates trying to reclaim the proceeds from illegal drug trafficking.
E. Impact on Other Groups
Because the Dusenbery Court affirmed the minimum require-
ment that parties send notice by certified mail,211 in most situa-
tions notice will either reach its intended party or will be re-
turned to the sender. However, the Dusenbery decision could
impact any group of people whose location, travel, and mail are
controlled by the government, such as members of the Armed
Forces, law enforcement agents, or other government employ-
ees.212 Government employees in a combat situation are especially
at risk of not receiving notice.213 If civil or criminal asset forfei-
ture proceedings were pending against property belonging to a
member of such a group, according to Mullane and Dusenbery, ac-
tual notice would not be required as long as the method of deliv-
ery was "reasonably calculated."21 4 Therefore, hypothetically, no-
206. Id. at 172 n.6.
207. See id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 170 (holding that personal service, as in the movie SAVING PRIVATE RYAN,
was unnecessary); see also id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority
that the Due Process Clause does not require "heroic efforts" to ensure actual notice).
209. Id. at 171.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 169.
212. See id. at 170.
213. Id. at 182 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
214. Id. at 167-68.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tice might arrive at a foreign base, and the base post office might
sign for the certified mail. However, due to an error within the in-
ternal base mail system, a soldier in a combat zone might never
receive notification of the forfeiture proceedings. The dissent dis-
missed this hypothetical, commenting that the chances of such an
event resulting in the irrevocable forfeiture of property are doubt-
ful.215 The majority was not willing to use this hypothetical as jus-
tification for extraordinary expectations of the government.216
Still, the Dusenbery decision may have broader implications on
a far greater population. Because the Court confirmed in Dusen-
bery that actual notice is not necessary as long as notice is "rea-
sonably calculated"21 7 and sent as if "desirous of actually inform-
ing" the interested party,"' lower courts have already begun to
examine the intent of the party sending the notification to help
determine the constitutional sufficiency of notice.21 9 In Greenbriar
Village v. City of Mountain Brook, 220 a landowner brought suit
against the City of Mountain Brook challenging the constitution-
ality of three city ordinances. 221 The "heaviest burden" of one or-
dinance fell on one landowner, Greenbriar Village ("Green-
briar").22 Therefore, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama concluded that the city should have
mailed notice to Greenbriar of the changes implemented by this
new ordinance. 23 Relying on both Mullane and Dusenbery, the
court determined that the sufficiency of the notice should be
weighed by examining the intent of the city.224 The court held that
notice to a related party was not the "method of notification that
would be used if the city were 'desirous of actually informing'
Greenbriar that its permit was about to be permanently termi-
nated."225
215. Id. at 182 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 170.
217. Id. at 168 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314, 319 (1950)).
218. Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
219. See Greenbriar Vill. v. City of Mountain Brook, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1302 (N.D.
Ala. 2002).
220. 202 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2002)
221. Id. at 1281.
222. Id. at 1300.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1302 (quoting Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S.161, 168 (2002)).
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Furthermore, because the Dusenbery Court refrained from im-
plementing an actual notice requirement,226 other courts may
likewise relax the standards that apply to private parties in civil
cases. If the Dusenbery holding carries over into civil cases, pri-
vate parties who are required to give notice may be held to the
Mullane "reasonably calculated" standard, instead of a more rig-
orous actual notice standard. The "reasonably calculated" stan-
dard gives the courts much more discretion to make a determina-
tion about the adequacy of notice.227 In contrast, if the courts were
bound by an actual notice standard, courts would lack discretion,
because adequacy would turn simply on whether or not notice
was received-a question of fact, not of law. While this increased
discretion may lead to minor inconsistencies throughout jurisdic-
tions, it also allows courts to examine notice on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Such flexibility promotes fairness because courts can take
into account unforeseen problems beyond the parties' control.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Dusenbery decision, appellate courts disagreed over
how to determine the sufficiency of notice in criminal cases.228
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dusenbery to clear up
the disparity in the lower courts. 229 As a result, three important
guidelines emerged from the majority's opinion. First, to test the
sufficiency of notice, courts should apply the Mullane standard.23 °
Second, due process does not require actual notice, as long as the
method of delivery is reasonably calculated to reach the intended
party.231 Third, alternative methods of notice known only through
hindsight will not render notice insufficient.28 2 The party contest-
ing notice has the burden of showing that the notifying party
226. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172-73.
227. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (holding
that notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties" of the pending action (emphasis added)); United States v. One Toshiba Color
Television, 213 F.3d 147, 153 (3rd Cir. 2000) ("Adequacy of notice is always evaluated by
reference to the surrounding circumstances.").
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 166-67.
230. Id. at 167.
231. Id. at 172-73.
232. Id. at 172.
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knew or should have known about the existence of a feasible al-
ternative.233
The emergence of these three concepts will impact the legal
community in several ways. First, the abolition of the actual no-
tice theory will give law enforcement officials more leeway to send
notice to inmates.234 Collaterally, inmates will shoulder a greater
burden when contesting notice because inmates will have to do
more than merely allege that they never received notice.235 In-
mates will now have to mount a strong attack on the methods
used by law enforcement to send notice. Additionally, this
harsher standard will prevent inmates from abusively using the
notice requirement as a loophole to retain possession of the pro-
ceeds of their illegal drug trade.236 This movement away from ac-
tual notice marks the Court's continuing departure from the War-
ren Court's expansion of inmates' rights.237
Second, the Dusenbery holding gives courts the power to de-
termine the sufficiency of notice on a case-by-case basis.23 ' This
increased discretion will promote fairness by extending flexibility
to parties whose method of delivery was reasonably calculated
but notice did not reach the intended party because of an uncon-
trollable outside factor, such as a postal system error. Such hy-
potheticals are even more realistic because of the decreased reli-
ability of the mail following the events on September 11, 2001.
This greater latitude, however, may lead to future inconsis-
tency among the courts. Should inconsistency become a wide-
spread problem, the Supreme Court may have to revisit this issue
in order to set specific parameters for the "reasonably calculated"
standard. While the smaller details of the Mullane standard may
need refining in the future, the Dusenbery decision finally has put
to rest the debate over actual notice.
W. Alexander Burnett
233. See id. at 169-70.
234. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part V.C.
237. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
238. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172-73.
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